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On 9 October 2008, Fiji’s High Court ruled 
that the President’s actions in appointing 
an interim cabinet in January 2007 and in 
continuing to rule by decree in the wake of 
Fiji’s 5 December 2006 coup ‘were valid and 
are held to be lawful’. The three-member 
High Court panel, led by acting Chief Justice 
Anthony Gates, drew the conclusion that 
‘exceptional circumstances existed’ because 
‘the stability of the State was endangered’, 
so the President was entitled to use certain 
‘prerogative powers’ not provided for in 
the constitution (High Court of Fiji 2008). 
The decision had, as was clearly intended, 
the effect of legitimising the post-coup 
interim order.
It is worth considering the context of the 
Qarase versus Bainimarama ruling.
The High Court’s judgment came 
as a shock to many in Fiji. Despite some 
controversies associated with judicial 
reaction to the 2000 coup, people in Fiji had 
grown accustomed to the courts seeming to 
be largely independent of political influence, 
reasonably dependable and held in high 
public esteem. Indeed, an extraordinary 
veneration came to exist for the rule of 
law in Fiji—paradoxically, to a far greater 
degree than the respect that existed for 
constitutional democracy. After the failed 
George Speight putsch in May 2000, Fiji’s 
courts ruled the post-coup interim regime 
led by Laisenia Qarase to be illegal. First, 
in the Lautoka High Court, presided over 
by the now acting Chief Justice Gates, 
and then in the Chandrika Prasad case 
before the Court of Appeal in 2001, judges 
found the 1997 Constitution to be intact 
and ordered a speedy return to democratic 
rule. In contrast, other countries, such as 
Nigeria and Pakistan, have considerably 
greater familiarity with court judgments 
that have aimed to legitimise post-coup 
governments. 
The Fiji experience was also unusual in 
another way. In the 2001 Chandrika Prasad 
judgment, the court said that ‘to its credit, 
the Interim Civilian Government in this 
case has adopted a very responsible stance’, 
making clear that ‘in the event of the 1997 
Constitution being upheld by the Courts, it 
would use its best endeavours to promote 
a return to constitutional legality’ (Court 
of Appeal 2001). This proved to be a solid 
commitment. In the wake of that judgment, 
the President had to be re-elected by the 
Great Council of Chiefs and Fiji returned 
to the polls. In other parts of the world, 
regimes that have arisen in the aftermath of 
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The 2001 Chandrika Prasad case was 
not the last of Fiji’s high-profile court 
judgments regarding the constitutionality of 
the Qarase-led government. After that case, 
interim Prime Minister Qarase proved able 
to win the subsequent election and form a 
majority government. This government too, 
however, was found to be unconstitutional, 
on the grounds that it had failed to follow 
constitutional provisions requiring all 
parties with more than 10 per cent of seats to 
participate in cabinet (Court of Appeal 2002, 
2003; Supreme Court 2004). Initially, the 
government contested the ruling and, when 
it was upheld, the government sought to 
conform to the letter but not the spirit of the 
law by offering powerless token ministries to 
the Fiji Labour Party, which were eventually 
refused. After a further election in May 2006, 
however, which returned Qarase’s Soqosoqo 
Duavata ni Lewenivanua party to office, 
the Prime Minister formed a multi-party 
cabinet that included leading members 
of the previously excluded Fiji Labour 
Party, as required by the constitution. The 
portfolios, including labour, agriculture and 
health, were substantial. It was a fraught 
arrangement, however, largely because Fiji 
Labour Party leader Mahendra Chaudhry 
preferred to remain outside cabinet. The 
arrangement was ultimately destroyed 
by the military coup of 5 December 2006. 
Nevertheless, this was the first time since 
independence that political leaders from 
Fiji’s two major political parties—one 
representing the now 57 per cent ethnic 
Fijians and the other representing the 37 
per cent Indo-Fijians—had attempted to 
cooperate in cabinet. It was a promising if 
stillborn experiment.
In other words, as regards the two 
major constitutional issues brought before 
the courts during 2000–06, judges in both 
cases found the Qarase government to be 
illegal. In both cases, that government—
eventually—accepted the court’s verdict, 
and reconstructed itself accordingly. Now, 
however, when that government has been 
illegally ousted from office by the Royal 
Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) and looks to the 
courts for protection, far from finding that 
usurpation of power and the subsequent 
presidential decrees to be unlawful, the 
courts instead have ruled in such a way as 
to legitimise the post-coup interim order. 
The ‘stability of the State’ was said to have 
been endangered, justifying the President’s 
use of extraordinary ‘prerogative powers’ 
not provided for in the constitution. No 
consideration was given to the fact that 
the source of that instability was the 
Commander of the RFMF himself, who, as 
a result of the exercise of these prerogative 
powers, became Prime Minister. It is a 
deeply flawed judgment—one that is likely 
to have long-term negative repercussions for 
the respect in which the courts have been 
held in Fiji.
Unfortunately, there can be little 
expectation that Fiji’s Court of Appeal 
or Supreme Court will reverse the High 
Court’s judgment. Fiji’s judiciary has been 
thoroughly reshaped since the 2006 coup. 
First, the Chief Justice, Daniel Fatiaki, was 
controversially ‘suspended’ in January 
2007, and Justice Gates appointed as acting 
Chief Justice under circumstances widely 
interpreted to have been illegal (see, for 
example, Crawford 2007). The President of 
the Court of Appeal, Gordon Ward, refused 
to accept renewal of his appointment under 
the new order; his house in Pacific Harbour 
was burnt to the ground in suspicious 
circumstances. The six remaining expatriate 
Australian judges on Fiji’s Court of Appeal 
resigned in September 2007, saying that 
it was apparent that their services were 
not wanted. Former Fiji Supreme Court 
judge Robert French, now Chief Justice 
in Australia, in explaining his reasons for 
declining the renewal of his appointment 
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so would entail an ‘implicit bargain’ with 
the interim government and that, ‘when 
faced with a challenge to the lawfulness of 
the government itself, such a judge could 
be seen to have a conflict of interest’ (The 
Australian, 2 May 2008). High Court judge 
Justice Gerard Winter similarly decided, as 
he put it, that ‘I could not renew my warrant 
in 2008 if the military regime was still in 
power as to do so would run contrary to 
my original oath of office’ (The Australian, 
15 August 2008).
There are several other Australian 
judges, who took their commissions from 
an elected government, who are still 
sitting on the Supreme Court, but their 
appointments expire before the end of 2008 
or in early 2009. Clearly, the extraordinary 
delay—from March to October 2008—before 
the announcement of the verdict in Qarase 
versus Bainimarama has contributed to the 
probability that these remaining judges 
will be unable to hear any appeal in the 
Qarase versus Bainimarama case, should 
this reach the Supreme Court. Those who 
sit on the benches of Fiji’s courts will, by 
then, be almost exclusively judges who have 
accepted appointments under the interim 
order, or local judges who may, for obvious 
reasons, find great difficulty ruling in such 
a way as to contest the authority of the post-
coup government. The right course for the 
deposed government is surely to appeal to 
the higher courts; but the likelihood of a 
satisfactory outcome—this side of a general 
election—seems slender.
Some in Fiji had hoped—understandably, 
if perhaps naively—that Justice Gates 
in particular would rule the interim 
government illegal and pave the way for 
the restoration of constitutional democracy. 
That, after all, would have been in accord 
with Gates’ statement in the November 
2000 ruling in Chandrika Prasad vs the State 
(Lautoka High Court 2000) that ‘a judge’s 
first duty is to uphold the Constitution’, and 
his comment in the same case that ‘it is not 
the oath taken or the regime under which an 
appointment is made that colour a judge’s 
role on legitimacy. A judge is expected 
to act at all times impartially, fairly, with 
integrity, and to uphold all the laws of the 
land, independently of the regime existing 
at the time of his or her appointment.’ It was 
for that 2000 decision that Justice Gates was 
celebrated by Commonwealth legal scholars 
as a founder of the ‘new jurisprudence’ on 
coups, and was credited with having put 
forward a new doctrine potentially with 
‘canonical’ authority that might replace 
the so-called ‘dodgy jurisprudence’ 
developed in coup-prone countries such 
as Pakistan and Nigeria (Hatchard and 
Ogowewo 2003:23). Alas, that courage 
to stand up to a post-coup government 
and pronounce it to be illegal was not to 
be repeated in the verdict on the Qarase 
versus Bainimarama case. 
Instead, Justice Gates and his colleagues 
made a ruling that ‘prerogative powers’ 
existed that were not found in the 1997 
Constitution. These, we are told, date back 
1,000 years to the Norman Conquest, to the 
era before the subordination of kings and 
queens to parliaments. Supporting case 
history is sought from the British Raj and 
wartime exigencies under colonial control. 
It is as if no Commonwealth country, freeing 
itself from colonial rule, is empowered 
to write its own constitution in such a 
way as to constrain presidential powers. 
Such a ruling is all the more dubious and 
unbalanced when one bears in mind that the 
1997 Constitution—whatever its flaws and 
whatever the manner of its construction—was 
essentially a compact between the leaders of 
Fiji’s two largest communities and sought to 
limit very precisely the scope of presidential 
powers. Despite claiming to be a ‘purposive’ 
interpretation of Fiji’s constitution, there was 
no serious inquiry into the intentions of the 
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The heroic era of Fiji’s higher courts is 
clearly over. This was not a judgment, like 
that of the Court of Appeal in March 2001, 
which sought to encourage Fiji to return to 
constitutional democracy. On the contrary, 
by endowing the Office of the President with 
such far-reaching ‘prerogative powers’, it 
greatly encourages would-be usurpers of 
those ‘ultimate reserve powers’. The present 
context is important. The visibly ailing 
incumbent President, Ratu Josefa Iloilo, 
openly acknowledged on his ‘resumption’ 
of office in early January 2007 that he had, as 
he put it, been ‘unable to perform my duties’ 
during the critical days after the 5 December 
coup. It is well known that the Office of 
the President has, for several years, been 
controlled by military minders. Moves have 
for months been under way by the interim 
government to restructure Fiji’s Great 
Council of Chiefs, largely because this is 
the appointing authority for the presidency. 
In other words, what has been vastly 
strengthened by this judgment is not really 
the president himself, but the Office of the 
President. It opens the way for the usurpers, 
under the fiction of constitutionality, to 
exercise extraordinary powers should they 
prove able—officially and unofficially—to 
capture the presidency.
Furthermore, it is well known that—
particularly in deeply divided societies 
such as Fiji—having power concentrated so 
heavily in a single pair of hands is a poor 
constitutional choice (Lijphart 1994; Linz 
1994; but see Shugart and Mainwaring 1997). 
Since the president is also not popularly 
elected in Fiji, increasing his or her powers 
is all the more dangerous. In other words, 
the ‘coup to end all coups’ has now written 
for itself a charter for all future coups.
Where does the Qarase vs Bainimarama 
judgment leave Fiji? Clearly, those many 
people in Fiji who have been removed from 
their positions or suffered economically as 
a result of the coup cannot expect redress 
from the courts. The regime’s position, in 
this sense, would appear to be strengthened. 
We should remember, however, that the 
post-2000 pattern of legal redress in Fiji 
was, internationally, highly unusual. More 
usually, what proves more important to 
bringing military regimes to an end is 
the corrosive impact of lack of internal 
legitimacy and the absence of international 
support (Finer 1962). Both these factors 
helped Fiji, eventually, back to democracy 
and indeed towards a new, more broadly 
acceptable constitution after 1990.
Fiji in October 2008 had reached a hiatus. 
The regime’s anti-corruption initiatives, 
its attempted restructuring of the Great 
Council of Chiefs and its ‘People’s Charter’ 
had drawn no groundswell of support. 
The interim government has, however, so 
far encountered negligible open collective 
defiance, despite a seething and perhaps now 
broadening discontent. There is a danger, 
now that the High Court has ruled the regime 
lawful and now that elections have been put 
off indefinitely, that the safety valve comes off 
and resistance begins to grow. That in turn 
might encourage a military clamp-down or 
possibly, connected to this, schisms within the 
RFMF. To avoid this type of outcome, both 
sides surely have an interest in some form of 
dialogue, preferably under the auspices of 
the Pacific Islands Forum, possibly aided by 
the United Nations and the Commonwealth. 
In the face of a still apparently belligerent 
military leadership, those favouring a return 
to genuine constitutionality rather than the 
retention of sham constitutionality surely 
have an interest in presenting some clear 
alternative to the interim government’s 
initiatives: 1) perhaps by coming together 
around a ‘democratic charter’ (to counter 
those who want amendment to the 
constitution by presidential decree); 2) 
perhaps by making some open concessions 
to the widely endorsed arguments against 
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previously divisive legislation so as to bring 
together pro-democracy forces; and, most 
of all, 3) by putting forcefully the case for 
power sharing as the superior alternative to 
the utopian goal of military transcendence 
of the deep divisions that have dogged Fiji 
since independence.
Note
This paper was originally presented to a 
panel discussion on Courts and Coups: 
Fiji’s October 2008 High Court Judgment in 
the Qarase Vs Bainimarama Case organised 
by the State, Society and Governance in 
Melanesia Program, Research School of Pacific 
and Asian Studies, The Australian National 
University, and held at The Australian 
National University, 21 October 2008.
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